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This paper evaluates the macroeconomic and distributional eects of government bailout
guarantees for Government Sponsored Enterprises (such as Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac)
in the mortgage market. In order to do so we construct a model with heterogeneous,
innitely lived households and competitive housing and mortgage markets. Households
have the option to default on their mortgages, with the consequence of having their homes
foreclosed. We model the bailout guarantee as a government provided and tax-nanced
mortgage interest rate subsidy. We nd that eliminating this subsidy leads to substantially
lower equilibrium mortgage origination and increases aggregate welfare, but has little eect
on foreclosure rates and housing investment. The interest rate subsidy is a regressive policy:
eliminating it benets low-income and low-asset households who did not own homes or had
small mortgages, while lowering the welfare of high-income, high-asset households.
Keywords: Housing, Mortgage Market, Default Risk, Government-Sponsored Enter-
prises
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1 Introduction
The United States displays one of the highest home ownership rates in the world at close to 70%,
and owner-occupied houses constitute the most important asset for most U.S. households. Part
of the attractiveness of owner-occupied housing stems from a variety of subsidies the government
provides to homeowners. In addition to tax-deductible mortgage interest payments and the fact
that implicit income from housing capital (i.e. the imputed rental-equivalent) is not taxable, a
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We have beneted from helpful comments by seminar participants at the Wharton macro lunch, the Banco de
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1third subsidy arises from government intervention in the mortgage market. In the US close to
50% of residential mortgages are held by so-called Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSE's),
totalling more that $5 trillion. In September 2008, the US Treasury took conservatorship of
Fannie Me and Freddie Mac after huge losses following the collapse of house prices. Since then,
the US government has provided more than $153 billion to help GSE's remain solvent. Policy
makers are currently faced with deciding the future of GSE's and the role of the government in
providing insurance in the mortgage market.
In this paper we ask what are the macroeconomic and distributional consequences of govern-
ment guarantees for GSE's, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. We model the consequences
of this bailout guarantee as a tax-nanced mortgage interest rate subsidy. Prior to their bailout
in 2008, the GSE's could borrow at interest rates close to that on U.S. government debt, despite
the fact that they were heavily exposed to aggregate house price risk (as has become abundantly
clear during the recent crisis). The absence of a signicant risk premium can be attributed to the
then implicit government bailout guarantee these institutions enjoyed. Currently the GSE's are
explicitly backed by the US government and as a consequence enjoy lower borrowing costs than
private companies. To the extend that part of the interest advantage of GSE's is passed through
to homeowners (at least partially), there exists a mortgage interest rate subsidy from the federal
government to homeowners. This subsidy must be nanced by increased tax revenues, either to
nance the bailout in case of a collapse in the housing market directly or to service the increased
government debt resulting from the bailout.
In order to evaluate the aggregate and redistributive consequences of this subsidy we construct
a heterogeneous agent general equilibrium model with incomplete markets in the tradition of
Bewley (1986), Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994). We augment this model by a real estate
sector and we allow households to borrow against their real estate wealth positions through
collateralized mortgages. In the model households can default on their mortgages, with the
consequence of losing their homes. Competitive mortgage companies price the default risk into
the mortgage interest rates they oer. The implicit (prior to 2008) or explicit (since 2008)
support of GSE's is modeled as a tax-nanced direct subsidy to mortgage interest rates. Our
stationary economy corresponds to a world in which the government taxes income every period
and either saves the proceeds in an eort to smooth out the spending shock triggered by a
potential insolvency of the GSE's, or alternatively, is able to buy insurance against that shock
from the outside world via, say, a market for credit derivatives. Under this interpretation the
tax revenues constitute the required funds to cover the necessary insurance premium.
In addition to addressing the applied policy question stated above, we view as a second contri-
bution of our paper the theoretical characterization of mortgage interest rates in our equilibrium
model with foreclosure. First, we show that mortgages are priced exclusively based on leverage,
with more highly levered households paying higher interest rates. This result is important be-
cause it provides a concise characterization of the mortgage price function which allows us to deal
with the continuous choice of mortgage contracts by households. It also facilitates the ecient
computation of an equilibrium in our model. Second, we prove that a minimum down payment
requirement arises endogenously in our model. Finally, we provide a partial characterization of
the household decision problem that provides insights into why households might simultaneously
save in low interest bearing risk-free bonds and borrow in mortgages that carry higher inter-
est rates. We therefore believe that our model provides a useful framework for future analyses
of the housing and mortgage market with collateralized default, and consequently might be of
2independent interest.
Our quantitative results can be described as follows. First, comparing stationary equilibria
with and without the policy, a tax-nanced interest rate subsidy of 40 basis points1 leads to a
signicant increase in mortgage origination, but has little eect on investment in housing assets
or in the equilibrium construction of real estate. The mortgage subsidy does not signicantly
change the share of households with positive holdings of real estate, because on one hand the
subsidy makes real estate ownership more attractive, but on the other hand the higher required
taxes lower net of tax income and thus discourage homeownership for low-income and low-asset
households. However, the subsidy does signicantly aect the distribution of leverage in the
economy by increasing both the fraction of households that have positive mortgage debt and the
level of leverage. This suggests that the GSE's may have led to over-investment in mortgages
and excess household leverage, which may have exacerbated the response to the recent drop in
house prices.
Using a steady state utilitarian social welfare functional we nd that the aggregate welfare
implications of the subsidy are negative, in the order of 0:8% of consumption equivalent variation.
However, since households are heterogeneous, there is disagreement over the desirability of the
subsidy. Low-wealth households prefer to live in a world without the subsidy, whereas high-
wealth households prefer to live in a world with the subsidy. This can be explained by the fact
that low-wealth households hold little or no housing, and thus do not benet from the subsidy,
as compared to high wealth households that have large homes and mortgages.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper aims at making two contributions, and thus is related to two broad strands of the liter-
ature. On the substantive side, it provides a quantitative, model-based analysis of the macroeco-
nomic and distributional consequences of mortgage interest rate subsidies through guaranteeing
the GSE's. It therefore complements empirical work that evaluates the importance of the GSE's
and their government guarantee for the housing and mortgage market. Frame and Wall (2002a,b)
and more recently Acharya et al. (2011) provide a thorough summary of the institutional details
surrounding GSE's. We use the empirical estimates of CBO (2001) that quantied the borrow-
ing interest rate advantage of GSE's to approximately 40 basis points to motivate our policy
thought experiment. More broadly, our paper contributes to the literature that studies the pos-
itive and normative implications of government housing subsidies on equilibrium allocations. In
this regard, our work is most closely related to Gervais (2001) who constructs a heterogeneous
household general equilibrium life cycle model to evaluate the eects of the other two main gov-
ernment housing subsidies: the tax-deductibility of mortgage interest rates and the fact that
the implicit income from owner-occupied housing capital is not subject to income taxation. Our
contribution, relative to his, is to introduce mortgage default (foreclosure) into a dynamic general
equilibrium model, and to use it to study a dierent government housing subsidy policy
Thus a second, model-building and theoretical contribution of the paper is to develop an
equilibrium model with mortgage debt and foreclosure in which mortgage interest rates are
1The Congressional Budget Oce (CBO, 2001) estimated that GSE's were able to borrow at a rate of roughly
40 basis points below that of private companies on account of the (at that time implicit) bailout guarantee.
Several studies (e.g., Passmore, Sherlund and Burgess (2005) and Blinder, Flannery, and Kamihachi (2004)) have
argued that a signicant portion, if not all of the subsidy is passed on to homeowners.
3determined by competition of nancial intermediaries, and fully reect equilibrium default prob-
abilities. In this regard, our model can be seen as a natural extension of the literature on uncol-
lateralized debt and equilibrium default by Chatterjee et al. (2007) and Livshits et al. (2007).
More broadly, our model shares many elements with the recent model-based quantitative housing
literature.2 For example, Chambers et al. (2009) and R os- Rull and S anchez-Marcos (2008) in-
corporate a housing tenure and mortgage choice into a general equilibrium framework. As we do,
Gruber and Martin (2003) also study the distributional eects of the inclusion of housing wealth
in a general equilibrium model, but do not address the role of government housing subsidies for
this question.
Especially relevant for the purpose of our analysis are the three recent papers by Corbae
and Quintin (2010), Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2011), and Garriga and Schlagenhauf (2009)
that build general equilibrium models of housing that also feature equilibrium mortgage default,
in order to evaluate the eects of the drop in house prices and a change in housing supply on
equilibrium foreclosure rates. Their focus is mainly to understand the underlying reasons for
and consequences of the recent foreclosure crisis3 in the U.S. whereas our focus is on studying
the eects of a specic government housing market policy. We see our paper as complementary
to theirs in terms of focus, but also in terms of the details of how mortgages and foreclosure is
modeled. In these papers mortgages are long term contracts whereas we permit households to
costlessly renance in every period. This modeling choice, in conjunction with perfect competi-
tion in the mortgage market allows us to obtain a sharp analytical characterization of equilibrium
mortgage interest rates and default behavior in our model.4
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and
denes equilibrium in an economy with a housing and mortgage market. Section 3 characterizes
equilibria. Section 4 describes the calibration of our economy. Section 5 details the numerical
results comparing two steady states in economies with and without a mortgage interest subsidy.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of measure one of innitely lived households, a
continuum of competitive banks and a continuum of housing construction companies. As both
the nancial and the real estate sector is competitive and thus all rms will make zero prots
in equilibrium we abstract from specifying ownership of the banks and real estate construction
companies. Households face idiosyncratic endowment and house price shocks. In what follows
we will immediately proceed to describing the economy recursively.
2For a brief survey, see Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011).
3An important, empirically oriented literature, has recently studied the causes and consequences of the recent
boom in foreclosures in the U.S. See e.g. Campbell et al. (2011), Gerardi et al. (2009) or Mian et al. (2011).
4Krainer et al. (2009) construct a dynamic stochastic continuous time mortgage valuation model and also
provide a partial analytical characterization of the interest rate and asset value of mortgages, as a function of the
mortgage leverage.
42.1 Households
Preferences: Households derive period utility U(c;h) from consumption and housing services
h; which can be purchased at a price pl (relative to the numeraire consumption good). Households
discount the future with discount factor  and are expected utility maximizers.
Endowments: Households receive an idiosyncratic endowment of the perishable consumption
good given by y 2 Y: These endowments follow a nite state Markov chain with transition
probabilities (y0jy) and unique invariant distribution (y): We denote by  y =
P
y2Y y(y)
the average endowment. We will use the terms endowment and (labor) income interchangeably
throughout the remainder of the paper, and assume that a law of large number applies, so that
 and  also denote deterministic fractions of households receiving a particular income shock y:
The government levies a proportional tax  on labor income to nance an interest rate subsidy,
if such a policy is in place.
Assets: In addition to consumption and housing services the household spends income to
purchase two types of assets, one-period pure discount bonds b0 and perfectly divisible houses g0:
The price of bonds is denoted by Pb and the price of houses by Ph: Houses are risky assets: they
are subject to idiosyncratic house price shocks. Let F(0) denote the continuously dierentiable
cumulative distribution function of the price depreciation rate 0 tomorrow, which has support
D = [;1] with   0: A negative value of  indicates positive house price appreciation. We
assume that the realization of  is independent across time for every household, and that a law
of large number applies, so that F(:) is also the economy-wide distribution of house price shocks.
One unit of the housing asset generates one unit of housing services. A house purchased in
the current period can immediately be rented out and thus generates rental income in the same
period as the purchase. Households are prohibited from selling bonds and houses short.
Mortgages: Households can borrow against their real estate property. Let m0 denote the size
of the mortgage, and Pm the contemporaneous receipts of resources (that is, of the consumption
good) for each unit of mortgage issued today and to be repaid in the subsequent period. The
\price" Pm will be determined in equilibrium by competition of banks through a zero prot
condition, and will in general depend on the characteristics of households as well as the size of
the mortgage m0 and size of the collateral g0 against which the mortgage is issued. The gross
mortgage interest rate is simply given by Rm = 1=Pm:
Households that come into the next period with housing assets g0 and a mortgage m0 possess
the option, after having observed the idiosyncratic house price appreciation shock 0, of defaulting
on their mortgages, at the cost of losing their entire housing collateral. There are no other costs
associated with defaulting on the mortgage and having one's housing asset foreclosed. This
assumption, together with modeling mortgages as short-term contracts, immediately implies
that households will choose to default whenever the amount owed on the mortgage is greater
than the value of the house after the realization of the price shock, that is, if and only if5
m
0 > Ph(1   
0)g
0:
5We make the tie-breaking assumption that a household indierent between defaulting and not defaulting will
choose not to do so.
5As a consequence, the ex-ante default probability of a household at mortgage origination, that
is, prior to observing the shock, is simply a function of the size of the mortgage m0 and today's
value of the collateral g0Ph: As argued below, this will imply that in equilibrium the price of a
mortgage Pm today will only be a function of (m0;g0); a fact we will use when now specifying the
household problem in recursive formulation.
Recursive Formulation of the Household Problem: Let a denote cash at hand, that is,
after tax endowment plus the value from all assets brought into the period, after the current
income and house price shocks (y;) have materialized. The individual state of a household
consists of s = (a;y): The cross-sectional distribution over individual states is denoted by :
Since we will restrict our analysis to stationary equilibria in which  is constant over time, in
what follows the dependence of aggregate prices and quantities on  is left implicit.
The dynamic programming problem of a household consists of choosing consumption c; hous-































0 + maxf0;Ph(1   
0)g
0   m
0)g + (1   )y
0 (3)
Note that because of the assumption that newly purchased housing assets can immediately be
rented out, rental income g0Pl from newly purchased housing assets enters the current period
budget constraint. Tomorrow's cash at hand a0 is equal to the sum of after tax labor income
(1 )y0; the amount of bonds b0 brought into the period and the net value of real estate. If the
household owes less than the realized value of her housing asset, she does not default and the
net value of real estate equals Ph(1   0)g0   m0: Alternatively, for unfavorable realization of the
house price shock 0 the mortgage is under water, the household defaults and is left with zero
housing wealth.
2.2 The Real Estate Construction Sector
The representative rms in the perfectly competitive real estate construction sector face the
linear technology
I = Ch
where I is the output of newly build and perfectly divisible houses of a representative rm
and Ch is the input of the consumption good. Note that we assume that this technology is
reversible, that is, real estate companies can turn houses back into consumption goods using the
same technology (although this does not happen in the equilibrium of our calibrated economies).
Thus the problem of a representative rm reads as
max
I;Ch
PhI   Ch (4)
s.t.
I = Ch
6and the equilibrium house price necessarily satises
Ph = 1
In eect, ours is a model with exogenous house prices normalized to Ph = 1; but endogenous
rents and thus endogenous house-price to rent ratios), and perfectly elastic supply of the housing
asset from the real estate companies at that exogenous house price.
2.3 The Banking Sector
Let rb denote the risk free interest rate on one-period bonds, to be determined in general equi-
librium. Competitive banks take their costs Pb = 1
1+rb of re-nancing as given. In addition, we
assume that issuing mortgages is costly; let rw be the percentage real resource cost, per unit of
mortgage issued, to the bank. This cost captures screening costs, administrative costs as well
as maintenance costs of the mortgage (such as preparing and mailing a quarterly mortgage bal-
ance). In addition, in order to insure mortgages against the (unmodeled) aggregate component
of mortgage default risk, banks need to purchase insurance at a cost  for each dollar of mort-
gage originated. We think of this  as a real resource cost that is transferred to an unmodeled
insurance company abroad.
The government can subsidize mortgages using receipts from labor income taxes. We model
any mortgage subsidy as an interest rate subsidy  for each unit of mortgage originated. Thus,
as a consequence, the eective net cost of the banking sector for nancing one dollar of mortgage
equals rb +rw + . We will consider two polar cases: one in which the government subsidizes
the mortgage exactly at the rate equal to the cost of insurance against aggregate risk,  = 
(which we think of as the bailout policy being in place), and one in which the government and
thus the bailout policy is absent,  = 0:
In the perfectly competitive banking sector, risk-neutral banks compete for customers loan
by loan, as in Chatterjee et al. (2007), in the context of uncollateralized debt. Banks will only
originate mortgages that yield non-negative prots in expectation. Banks, when making their
origination decision, take into account the fact that a household may default on its mortgage.
When a household does so, the bank seizes the housing collateral worth (1   0)g0. However,
we assume that the technology for foreclosing is possibly inecient, and therefore that the bank
only recovers a fraction   1 of the value of the collateral.
For ease of exposition we assume that the cost rw of mortgage generation is paid when the
mortgage is repaid, and not when it is issued. This implies that households defaulting on their
mortgage payments also default on paying for the cost of generating the mortgage. Note that
since this cost is fully priced into the mortgage and thus reected in Pm, this assumption is
without loss of generality but makes the notation in the banks' problem less cumbersome.
In order to dene a typical banks' problem we rst have to characterize the optimal default
choice of a household. As argued in section 2.1 the household defaults if and only if her mortgage
is under water. Thus for a household with housing assets g0 and a mortgage m0 there is a cuto
level for house price depreciation (m0;g0) at which a household is indierent between defaulting
and not defaulting on her mortgage. It is determined as
m











0) = 1  
m0
g0 = 1   
0 (5)
where 0 = m0
g0 is dened as the leverage (for g0 > 0) of a mortgage m0 backed by real estate g0.
Thus the household defaults for all house price depreciation realizations 0 > (0): Whenever
(0) <  (e.g. if g0 = 0 and thus 0 = 1) the household defaults for sure in the next period
and we set (0) = ; that is, formally

(
0) = maxf;1   
0g
Note again that since the foreclosure decision of a household does not depend on the bond
holdings b0 chosen today or current income y of the household, in equilibrium the receipts Pm
will not depend on those quantities either.
Using the characterization of the household default decision, we can characterize the set of




















The left hand side m0Pm (g0;m0) is the amount the bank pays out to a household that takes on a
mortgage of size m0 collateralized by g0 housing assets. The term in fg-brackets are the receipts
tomorrow for the bank from the mortgage. With probability F((0)) the household receives a
house price shock 0 that makes default suboptimal in which case she repays the full face value of
the mortgage m0: For all price shocks 0 > (0) the household defaults and the bank retrieves
(1 0)g0 by foreclosing and selling o the house. For each dollar of mortgage issued today the
costs of funds to the bank are 1+rb; the direct costs of maintaining one dollar worth of mortgage
are rw; the insurance costs per dollar of mortgage are  and the subsidy per dollar is ; so that
the eective discount factor of the bank is given by 1
1+rb+rw+ :
Notice that one direct and obvious consequence of equation (6) is that Pm (g0 = 0;m0) = 0
for all m0 > 0; that is, a mortgage m0 > 0 without collateral, i.e. with g0 = 0; will not generate
any funds for the household today. Without collateral (g0 = 0) and m0 > 0 the household will
default on the mortgage for sure tomorrow and foreclosure will not generate any revenues for the
bank. Therefore the right-hand size of equation (6) equals zero, and thus Pm (g0 = 0;:m0) = 0
2.4 The Government
As stated above, the government levies income taxes at a at rate  on households to nance
the mortgage interest rate subsidy. The tax revenues of the government are given by  y: In the
baseline economy, as discussed above, we model the bailout guarantee provided by the government
as an interest rate subsidy equal to the cost of insurance  = . We interpret this as the
government levying income taxes to provide insurance to banks against systemic mortgage risk.
The overall costs of the interest rate subsidy can be calculated as follows. For a loan of given
size m0 the resources advanced to the household today by the bank are m0Pm (g0;m0; = ). If
there were no subsidy, these would be m0Pm (g0;m0; = 0).
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Note that  also measures the amount of resources expended on insurance against aggregate
shocks, either by the households directly (in case of no bailout policy) or by the government.





To summarize, the two policies we will compare are
Case 1 [Benchmark] Government Bailout/Subsidy: Households face mortgage prices Pm(g0;m0; =
) and taxes  given by (7)
Case 2 [Counterfactual] No Government Bailout/Subsidy: Households face mortgage prices
Pm(g0;m0; = 0) and taxes  = 0:
2.5 Equilibrium
We are now ready to dene a stationary recursive Competitive Equilibrium for the benchmark
economy. Let S = R+  Y denote the individual state space.
Denition Given a government subsidy policy  a Stationary Recursive Competitive
Equilibrium are value and policy functions for the households, v;c;h;b0;m0;g0 : S ! R;
policies for the real estate construction sector I;Ch; prices Pl;Pb; mortgage pricing function
Pm : R+  R+ ! R; a government tax rate  and a stationary measure  such that
1. (Household Maximization) Given prices Pl;Pb;Pm and government policies the value func-
tion solves (1) and c;h;b0;m0;g0 are the associated policy functions.
2. (Real Estate Construction Company Maximization) Policies I;Ch solve (4):
3. (Loan-by-Loan Competition) Given Pb and Pm, (6) holds with equality for all m0;g0.
6Here Pm(g0;m0; = ) and Pm(g0;m0; = 0) denote the mortgage pricing functions for the same interest rate
rb; that is, Pm(g0;m0; = 0) is the hypothetical mortgage pricing function without the subsidy, but evaluated at
the interest rate rb in the economy with the subsidy.
7Note that in equilibrium when all loans make exactly zero prots,
sub(m0;g0) =
m0Pm(g0;m0; = )
1 + rb + rw + 
:
That is, the cost of the subsidy per dollar of mortgage generated for the government is 
1+rb+rw+  :
94. (Government Budget Balance) The tax rate function  satises (7); given the functions
m0;Pm:















7. (Market Clearing in the Goods Market)
Z
c(s)d + I +  =  y
8. (Invariance of Distribution ). The measure  is invariant with respect to the Markov
process induced by the exogenous Markov process  and the policy functions m0;g0;b0:
When we derive the welfare consequences of removing the mortgage interest subsidy, we





where  is the invariant measure over the state space for cash at hand and income, s = (a;y).
3 Theoretical Results
In this section we state theoretical properties of our model that provide insights into the forces
that determine optimal household portfolio and leverage choices, but are also useful in the com-
putation of the equilibria. We fully characterize mortgage interest rates and prove the existence
of an endogenous down payment requirement. Next, we prove the existence of a solution to
the household problem and provide a partial characterization of the household portfolio choice.
Finally, we derive an upper bound on the equilibrium rental price Pl.
3.1 Mortgage Interest Rates








From equation (6) and the fact that competition requires prots for all mortgages issued in
equilibrium to be zero we immediately obtain a characterization of equilibrium mortgage interest
rates:
10Proposition 1 In any steady-state equilibrium, mortgages originated with positive collateral g0 >
0 have the following properties:
1. They are priced exclusively based on leverage 0 = m0
g0 ; that is Pm(m0;g0) = Pm(0) and
rm(0).
2. Pm(0) is decreasing in 0; and strictly decreasing if the household defaults with positive
probability. Thus mortgage interest rates rm(0) are increasing in leverage 0:




; i.e. they can borrow at the rate rb + rw +    :





today, that is, they borrow with a risk premium rm(0) > rb + rw +    :








































which proves the mortgages are priced exclusively on leverage. The second and third points
follow from the denition of the CDF of 0 and the optimal default choice (0). To prove the
nal point, note that for all 0 > (0) we have

0(1   0) < 1.
This characterization of equilibrium mortgage interest rates now allows us to obtain an en-
dogenous upper bound for the leverage.
3.2 Endogenous Down Payment Requirement
It is straightforward to show that it is never strictly benecial for a household to purchase a
mortgage with a leverage higher than the level that leads to subsequent default with probability
one. Dene the leverage that leads to certain default by  : At this amount of leverage, even
the most favorable realization of the house price shock leads to default, that is ( ) = : From
equation (5) it follows that
  = 1   
We now show that there exists a tighter endogenous upper bound on leverage  <   that
households will never choose to exceed in equilibrium. This result also implies that it is never
optimal for the household to lever up to the point in which default occurs with probability 1.
Furthermore we demonstrate that, at least with  = 0; any mortgage chosen by households in
equilibrium requires a positive down payment.
11Proposition 2 If F() is C2 and log-concave with support [;1],   0, there exists an endoge-
nous borrowing limit . That is, it is never optimal for a household to choose leverage  > 
at equilibrium mortgage prices Pm: Further,  <  . In addition, if  = 0, then  < 1, that is,
there is an endogenous minimum down payment 1    > 0.
Proof. See Appendix
Log-concavity of the distribution guarantees that the resources received today m0Pm(0) will
be concave in m0. This fact, combined with the smoothness assumption on the distribution of the
house price shocks, guarantees that the leverage that maximizes resources today will be strictly
less than the leverage that leads which to certain default. By increasing leverage beyond the level
that maximizes resources today, the household receives strictly less resources today and has to
repay weakly more resources tomorrow, implying that it can never be optimal for the household
to take on leverage above the level that maximizes contemporaneous resources received from the
mortgage.
Note that the (truncated) Pareto distribution which we will use in our quantitative analysis
for F() is C2 and log-concave.
3.3 Characterization of the Household Problem
We now show that the recursive problem of the household has a unique solution and provide a
partial characterization of the optimal decision rules. In order to do so it is helpful to split the
household problem into a static problem that optimally allocates a given amount of resources
between consumption and rental expenditures, and a dynamic consumption-saving and portfolio
choice problem.8
As a function of the rental price Pl and total expenditures c; dene the indirect static utility





~ c + Plh = c
Note that, in slight abuse of notation, cnow denotes total expenditures ~ c + Plh as opposed to
just nondurable consumption (as it was dened in previous sections).
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In the appendix we prove that the recursive problem of the household has a unique solution:
8Clearly our ability to do so hinges crucially on the existence of frictionless housing and rental markets and
the perfect substitutability of owner occupied housing and rentals in providing housing service ows.
12Proposition 3 Suppose that u(:;Pl) is unbounded from below and bounded from above. Then
recursive problem of the household has a unique solution v(a;y) that is strictly increasing in its
rst argument a:
Proof. See appendix
The fact that the utility function is bounded from above guarantees that even as the cash
at hand of a household diverges, the value function will remain bounded. Therefore, since
the utility function is unbounded from below, it will always be optimal to set consumption
expenditures c strictly away from zero, since contemporaneous utility diverges to negative innity
as consumption goes to zero, but the continuation value is bounded for all levels of saving. Note
that if the utility function U will be of CRRA form with risk aversion coecient  > 1 (and
a Cobb-Douglas aggregator between consumption and housing services) as we will assume in
our quantitative analysis, then the indirect utility function u satises the assumptions made in
proposition 3.
We now give a partial characterization of the household decision problem. For doing so it is
useful to dene as
P(
0) := 1   Pl   
0Pm(
0)
the net, per unit resources required to purchase g0 housing assets, partially nanced by a mortgage
with leverage 0 = m0=g0: Note that
g
0P(





Using this denition we can state the following:
Proposition 4 If u(c;Pl) is dierentiable in c, then for any state s for which it is optimal to
choose an interior solution to the portfolio choice problem (g0;b0;m0 > 0), the Euler equation
governing for the household is given by:
[Pb + P
0(











Further, at any such point the optimal leverage chosen by the household is determined by the
equation:
P(
0)   (1 + 
0)P
0(
0) = 1   Pl (9)
Proof. The result is a direct consequence of Theorem 3 in Clausen and Strub (2011). The
technical details are given in the appendix, section 7.2.3.
This partial characterization helps illustrate why households might simultaneously choose to
borrow and save. First, note from Proposition 1 that when the default probability is zero, in the
benchmark case with subsidy, households can borrow at a rate rb +rw and save in bonds at rate
rb. If rw were to equal zero, there would be an indeterminacy between saving and borrowing,
conditional on choosing mortgages with zero default probability. Having a positive cost of issuing
a mortgage, rw > 0; eliminates that indeterminacy and creates a wedge between the borrowing
and saving rate, even in the absence of default. However, even when there is a wedge in the
interest rates between borrowing and saving, it may be optimal for households to simultaneously
13save and hold mortgages (i.e. borrow). To understand why, rst consider the left-hand side of
equation (8). It represents the resources that need to be paid today by to marginally increase
leverage and use the funds from the additional mortgages m0 to purchase more bonds b0. We
interpret this as the insurance premium of borrowing to save at the risk free rate. The right-hand
side represents the expected stochastic discount factor, but only for states in which the household
defaults in the next period. Only the default states are relevant for this trade-o: in states for
which the household does not default the marginal increase in bond positions is exactly oset by
the marginal increase in mortgage debt, leaving the net wealth position unchanged. When the
household does default, however, she keeps the bonds without having to repay the mortgage. The
risk-free bonds thus provide insurance against low consumption in default states. The trade-o
reected in (8) then is between the cost of \insurance" today, given today's consumption, and
the marginal increase in consumption tomorrow from the payo of the additional risk-free bonds
b0.
Equation (9) shows that conditional on wanting to \borrow to save" there is a unique optimal
value 0 at which to do so. Thus the proposition predicts that the optimal policy function for
leverage is at over the region of the state space for which the household nds it optimal to
borrow, in order to save. Our quantitative analysis below will demonstrate that households nd
it indeed optimal to do so for a signicant part of the state space.
3.4 Bounds on the Equilibrium Rental Price of Housing
After having partially characterized the household problem we now derive an upper bound on
the rental price, one of the two prices to be determined in general equilibrium. In addition,
we pro Above we provided a full characterization of the mortgage pricing function Pm; and the
remaining equilibrium price Pb; as in any Bewley type model with innitely lived consumers,
satises Pb < 1=:
3.4.1 An Upper Bound
For all feasible choices of the household it has to be the case that P(0) = 1 Pl  0Pm(0)  0;
otherwise the household can obtain a positive cash ow today by buying a house with a mortgage;
the default option on the mortgage guarantees that the cash ow from the house tomorrow is
non-negative. Thus, the requirement of absence of this arbitrage opportunity in equilibrium
requires P(0)  0 for all 0, and, in particular, for 0 =  . Thus
P(
0 =  ) = 1   Pl    Pm(
0 =  )  0
which implies
P( ) = 1   Pl    Pm( )
= 1   Pl  

1




Pl  1  

1





rb + rw + E(0) + 1   
1 + rb + rw
14which places an upper bound on the equilibrium rental price. If  = 1; this condition simply
states that the rental price Pl cannot be larger than the user cost of housing, inclusive of the
cost rw of originating mortgages
rb+rw+E(0)
1+rb+rw :
3.4.2 Towards A Lower Bound
Due to the presence of idiosyncratic house price shocks, the housing asset is an inherently risky
asset. Households, however, can eectively choose the risky returns to housing by taking on
dierent levels of leverage. Since households are risk averse, for them to purchase the housing
asset, at some leverage the expected return to housing, weighted by the stochastic discount factor
of the household, must be greater than the return of the risk-free bond. This in turn implies a
lower bound on the rental price Pl: While we do not have a theoretical characterization of that
lower bound, we found in our quantitative analysis that the equilibrium rental price was such
that the expected return of housing at zero leverage was always at least as high as the risk free



















which states that the rental price of housing was not smaller than the (expected) user cost of
housing in equilibrium.9
In summary, we have partially characterized household behavior, developed a concise char-
acterization of the high-dimensional equilibrium mortgage interest rate function and a derived
bound for the equilibrium rental price, one of the endogenous prices to be determined in our anal-
ysis. However, to fully assess the aggregate and distributional consequences of the government
interest rate subsidy a quantitative analysis is required. We will proceed to it now.
4 Calibration
In mapping our model to the US we focus on the period 2000-2006, that is, on a period prior to
when the implicit bailout guarantee became explicit. We select some parameters exogenously,
taking targets and values from the relevant literature. The remaining parameters are calibrated
jointly in the model using a moment matching procedure.
9With  = 1 and rw = 0, maintaining our heuristic analysis, we would immediately obtain that the rental
price of housing Pl equals its user cost
rb+E(
0)
1+rb . In fact, what happens in this equilibrium is that households
purchase houses, lever up such that they default for sure tomorrow and the houses end up in the hand of the
banks. Since these are risk-neutral, and since default is fully priced into the mortgage and banks receive the full
(depreciated) value of the house, banks rather than households (which are risk averse) should (from a normative
perspective) and will end up owning the real estate.
154.1 Technology and Endowments
Income process: For a continuous state AR(1) process of the form
logy
0 = logy + (1   
2)
0:5" (10)








we can calculate the unconditional standard deviation to be e and the one-period autocorrelation
(persistence) to be : Estimates for  in the literature vary somewhat, but center around values
close to 1: Motivated by the analysis by Storesletten et al. (2004) we select  = 0:98: The
estimates for the standard deviation range from 0:2 to 0:4 (see Aiyagari (1994) for a discussion),
and we choose " = 0:3:
We approximate the continuous state AR(1) with a 5 state Markov chain using the proce-
dure put forth by Tauchen and Hussey (1991). Section 7.3.2 in the appendix gives the exact
values of the 5 income realizations, the Markov transition matrix  and the associated invariant
distribution :
Foreclosure technology: Two recent studies (Pennington-Cross (2004) and Campbell, Giglio
and Pathak (2011)) estimate the default loss parameter . Pennington-Cross looks at liquida-
tion sales revenue from foreclosed houses and compare it to a market price constructed via the
OFHEO repeat sales index. Campbell, Giglio and Pathak have access to zip code level data
in Massachusetts and compare foreclosed home sales to regional prices. Pennington-Cross nds
that on average the loss is 22% as opposed to 27% in Campbell, Giglio and Pathak. Since Camp-
bell, Giglio and Pathak use data from only one state, as compared to national estimates from
Pennington-Cross (and their estimates are relatively close to each other), we choose the more
conservative estimate and set  = 0:78.
The depreciation process: We calibrate the house value price depreciation process to attain
realistic levels of default in the model while at the same generating the statistical properties
of idiosyncratic house price appreciation and depreciation observed in the data. Since we are
conducting a steady-state analysis, we abstract from the aggregate component of house price
uctuations and secular aggregate house price growth.
According to the Mortgage Banker Association (MBA (2006)), the quarterly foreclosure rate
has been about 0:4 percent in between 2000 and 2006. Abstracting from the possibility that one
house may go in and out of foreclosure multiple times within one given year, this implies that
on an annual basis, banks start foreclosure proceedings on about 1:6 percent of their mortgages.
The ratio of mortgages in foreclosure that eventually end in liquidation was about 25 percent
in 2005, according to MBA (2006). Most homeowners avoid liquidation by either selling their
property, renancing their mortgage or just paying o the arrears. Consequently, only about 0:4
percent of mortgages actually end up in liquidation, in the way our model envisions it. Given
the unusually strong home price appreciation over the 2000-06 period we view this gure as a
lower bound on the long-run foreclosure rate and thus target a default rate of 0:5 percent of all
mortgages.
16We target two empirical moments of house price depreciation, the mean and the standard
deviation. The mean depreciation for residential housing according to the Bureau of Economic
Analysis was 1:48% between 1960 and 2002 (with standard deviation 0:05%), computed as con-
sumption of xed capital in the housing sector (Table 7.4.5) divided by the capital stock of
residential housing. With respect to the standard deviation of idiosyncratic house price depreci-
ation shocks, we utilize data from the Oce of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO).
It models house prices as a diusion process and estimates within-state and within-region annual
house price volatility. The technical details can be found in the paper by Calhoun (1996). The
broad range for the eight census regions is an annual volatility of 9 10% in the years 1998-2004.
We use the upper bound  = 0:10 to account for the fact that nationwide house price volatility
is slightly higher than the within-region volatility.
We found that using a log-normal distribution for house price appreciation of real estate in
our model, with a mean and standard deviation above, does not generate a sucient share of
foreclosures, since, at least within the context of our model, the right tail of the distribution
appears to be too thin to reproduce the empirical foreclosure target. In order to obtain more
realistic levels of mortgage default we therefore use a generalized Pareto distribution whose











With this parametric form for the house price depreciation distribution we now have three pa-
rameters k;; to pin down three moments: the mean depreciation rate, its standard deviation
and the equilibrium share of mortgages in default that the model generates endogenously.10
Table 1: Endogenously Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Interpretation Value Target
 Risk Aversion 3:911 Median Leverage
 Time Discount Factor 0:919 Risk-free Rate
k Pareto shape parameter 0.7304 Foreclosure Rate
 Pareto scale parameter 0.0077 House price volatility
 Pareto threshold paramter -0.0082 Average price depreciation
4.2 Preferences
10It is understood that, strictly speaking, all parameters determine all endogenous variables jointly. In our
discussion of the parameters to be calibrated within the model we associate a parameter to the data target it
aects most, quantitatively, in the model.
17Table 2: Exogenously Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Interpretation Value Target
Ah Technology Const. in Housing Constr. 1:0 none (normalized)
 Income Persistence 0.98 Storesletten at al (2004)
e Income Variance 0.3 Storesletten at al (2004)
 Foreclosure Technology 0:78 Pennington and Cross (2004)
 Share Parameter on Nondur. Cons. 0:8590 Exp. Share in BEA
 Implicit Interest Rate Subsidy 40 BP CBO (2001)
rw Mortgage administration fee 11 BP
For the period utility function, we assume a CRRA form with a Cobb-Douglas aggregator11
between consumption and housing services.
U (~ c;h) =
 
~ ch1 1    1
1   











We choose the parameter  such that the share of housing in total consumption expenditures
matches NIPA data, according to which this share has been steady at 14:1% over the last 40
years, with a standard deviation of only about 0:5%. This yields a value of  = 0:8590.
The time discount parameter  is endogenously calibrated to match an equilibrium risk free
rate of 1% in the benchmark economy. The CRRA parameter  is endogenously calibrated to
match median household leverage in the benchmark economy. We use data from the 2004 Sur-
vey of Consumer Finances and restrict our attention to only households with heads age 50 and
younger, to control for strong life-cycle trends in leverage. We then compute household leverage
using data on houses owned and mortgages owed on those homes. The median leverage is calcu-
lated to be 61% from the data. The resulting preference parameters are (;) = (0:919;3:911):
11We could have assumed a more general CES aggregator
U (~ c;h) =




but it is impossible to separately calibrate the parameters  and  from steady state relationships alone. In
addition, the roughly constant expenditure share of housing over time despite signicant uctuations in the
relative price of housing is consistent with the unit elasticity of substitution of the Cobb-Douglas special case
 ! 0.
184.3 Mortgage Parameters
For the interest rate subsidy we take the view that the pass-through of the subsidy is 100%; in
order to make the case for the GSE's as positive as possible. The size of the subsidy is then
chosen to match the estimated implicit interest rate dierential of around 40 basis points that
the GSE's enjoyed during the period of their implicit guarantee by the government. Finally we
pick a mortgage administration cost rw of 11 basis points, roughly equal to one quarter of the
mortgage subsidy. This choice corresponds to an annual cost of $110 for servicing a $100,000
mortgage. Tables 1 and 2 summarize our parameterization of the model.
5 Results
5.1 Inspecting the Mechanism
Before analyzing the eects of the bailout policy by comparing the equilibria with and without
the policy in place it is instructive to explain household behavior in the baseline economy. In
gures 1 and 2 we plot the housing and leverage policy functions of households, as a function of
cash at hand a; conditional on the lowest and highest current income realizations y1 and y5:
From gure 1 we observe that purchases of the housing assets are monotonically increasing in
cash at hand, and gure 2 displays the fact that leverage is high (at close to 80%) for households
with little wealth. Leverage then drops quickly, as cash at hand increases, to around 61% and
remains constant at that level. From the level of cash at hand for which a leverage of 61%
is optimal onwards households no longer decrease leverage with increasing wealth, but start
purchasing bonds as can be seen from the bond policy function displayed in gure 3. As cash
at hand increases further leverage remains constant, and the holdings of the nancial asset, the
housing asset at mortgages rise. Proposition 4 above helps to explain why households with high
wealth both borrow through high-interest mortgages and save with low-interest bearing bonds.
These households want to take advantage of the high return on housing, but would like to insure
against adverse house price shocks. Positive bond holdings are essentially insurance against bad
 realizations that might trigger default and thus reduce total total wealth to zero, in the absence
of positive bond holdings. In order to maintain a level of consumption above that of labor income
it is therefore optimal to hold bonds as insurance. Note that equation (9) determines uniquely
the optimal leverage of these households, which is calculated to be 61% in the baseline model.12
12Note that since asset poor households do not buy any bonds, households allocate a larger share of their
portfolios to bonds as cash at hand increases. This behavior of households may sound counterintuitive at rst,
but is consistent with results from the portfolio choice literature (see e.g. Cocco et al. (2005) or Haliassos and
Michaelides (2001)). These papers argue that it should be households with high cash at hand that hold a higher
share of their portfolio in the save asset since these households have high nancial relative to human wealth (the
present discounted value of future labor income). Consequently, these households expect to nance their current
and future consumption primarily with capital income, whereas low cash-at-hand people tend to rely mostly on
their labor income. Thus it is relatively more important for the high cash at hand people not to be exposed to a
lot of nancial asset return risk. In fact, since idiosyncratic labor income shocks and house depreciation shocks
are uncorrelated in our model, housing is not a bad asset for hedging labor income risk (of course the bond is
even better in this regard, but it also has a lower expected return).
195.2 Aggregate Eects of Removing the Subsidy
We now turn to our evaluation of the bailout policy where we compare steady state equilibria
of economies with and without a mortgage interest rates subsidy of 40 basis points. We rst
analyze the change in household behavior induced by the removal of the subsidy is removed, and
then discuss its aggregate, distributional and welfare implications.
The main economic impact on households from removing the subsidy is to make mortgages
less attractive by increasing the eective interest rate. The most notable dierence in household
choices can thus be seen in the leverage and bond policy functions in gures 5 and 6 respectively,
where each of the two panels plots the policy functions for both cases (subsidy, no subsidy) against
cash at hand, for a given current income level y 2 fy1;y5g. We observe that for households with
low levels of cash at hand the change in behavior induced by the removal of the subsidy is modest:
under both policy scenarios households with little wealth take on highly leveraged mortgages and
hold no bonds. As households get wealthier, however, without the subsidy leverage decreases
monotonically to zero. In the absence of the mortgage interest subsidy wealthy households do
not simultaneously hold bonds and mortgages, since the wedge in the interest rate between
saving and borrowing (even absent default risk) increased from 11 to 51 basis points. Thus the
change in the policy induces a massive reduction in leverage for wealthier households, and thus
a substantial reduction in mortgage debt held by these households. As gure 4 shows, the eect
on housing choice is much smaller. These two observations also imply that the removal subsidy
causes a shift in the balance of the household net worth portfolio away from bonds and towards
home equity as seen in gure 7. As a consequence of this general shift in households' portfolio
composition, the share of bonds in the net worth portfolio of the median household declines
substantially: whereas this household holds 57% of its net worth in bonds with the mortgage
subsidy, this share drops to zero without the subsidy.
How the change in household behavior translates into the main macroeconomic aggregates is
summarized in table 3. Aggregate mortgages taken out by households decline sharply, by 91%.
Despite this, the overall impact on aggregate investment into housing is actually slightly positive:
the stock of housing properties increases by 2:73%: Household labor income net of taxes increases
by about 0:59% (that is, exactly by the amount required to nance the interest rate subsidy in
general equilibrium).
The behavioral changes induced by a change in the subsidy in turn have signicant general
equilibrium price eects. Since the supply of housing increases, the equilibrium rental price
of housing decreases, by slightly more than one percent. The equilibrium risk-free interest rate
declines by 49 basis points in response to the removal of the subsidy since the demand for loans to
nance house purchases collapses. Note that the eective equilibrium interest rate on borrowing,
holding leverage constant, actually decreases by 9 basis points, since the 40 basis point increase
due to the removal of the subsidy is more than oset by the general equilibrium eect that
the reduction in the demand for loans has and that makes rb decline by 49 basis points. This
highlights that the key margin governing household asset and portfolio choice is not the absolute
cost of borrowing or return on saving, but the wedge between the borrowing and saving rate. With
the subsidy (and for a mortgage with zero default risk), the dierence in interest rates on saving
and borrowing was 11 basis points (equal to the per dollar cost rw of originating and maintaining
the mortgage). Without the subsidy, the eective interest rate on borrowing is 51 basis points
higher than (and thus exactly double) that of saving. This reduction in the attractiveness of
20Table 3: Numerical Results: Consequences of Removing the Subsidy
Variable Subsidy No Subsidy Dierence
%Sub 40bp 0bp -100%
Sub= y 0.591% 0% -100%
Pl 0.0281 0.0277 -1.5%
rb 1.0% 0.511% -0.489%
H 5.311 5.456 +2.73%
M 3.219 0.310 -93.7%
Default share 0.51% 0.41% -19.8%
Mean Net Worth 5.52 5.445 -1.36%
Median Bond Portfolio Share 57.29% -0.0% -100%
Wealth Gini 0.4594 0.4625 0.67%
(g0 > 0) 96.79% 96.66 -0.11%
(g0 > h) 43.00% 39.75% -7.56%
EV a -0.6352 -0.6207 0.8%
a Computed as consumption equivalent variation, that is
(EVno subs=EVsubs)
1=(1 )
mortgage borrowing is also reected in a decline in aggregate default rates which fall from 0.51%
to 0.41% per year. Note that since default and foreclosure is costly in terms of real resources (as
banks only recover a fraction  of the value of the home), this reduction in foreclosure rates due
to the removal of the subsidy will be a nontrivial factor in the welfare evaluation of the change
of the government's policy.
Given that the subsidy only benets home owners one would expect that removing it has
important consequences for the distribution of home ownership, wealth and welfare. Since the
only asset in positive net supply is real estate and we have already documented that the stock
of houses increases by 2:73% due to the removal of the subsidy, so does total wealth in the
economy. However, median net worth falls, about 1:4%. This rising gap between average and
median wealth suggests that the distribution of wealth becomes more dispersed without the
subsidy, which is conrmed by an increase in the Gini coecient for (net) wealth. Figure 8 that
displays the stationary wealth distributions with and without policy suggests that this is mainly
due to a larger fraction of households at the borrowing constraint and a slightly fatter right tail of
the wealth distribution in the scenario without the subsidy. Thus if wealth inequality is a direct
concern of policy makers the removal of the subsidy is counterproductive along this dimension.
Another potential rationale for (indirectly) subsidizing mortgage interest rates on the part
of the government is to increase home ownership rates in the economy. Table 3 shows that if
this is indeed the ultimate goal of the government, it is successful, according to our model. The
fraction of households that own some real estate, (g0 > 0); is slightly higher with than without
the interest rate subsidy. The fraction of households that own at least as much real estate as they
use for their own housing service consumption, (g0 > h) increases more substantially, from 39%
to 43% with the subsidy. Even though in our model owning real estate is somewhat disassociated
21from using that same real estate as owner occupied housing13, the fraction of households with
g0  h is the best proxy of home ownership rates in our model, and it is negatively aected by
the removal of the government subsidy.
5.3 Welfare and Distributional Implications of the Policy
We now turn to a discussion of the welfare consequences of the reform. Removing the mortgage
interest rate subsidy increases aggregate steady state welfare, as measured by consumption equiv-
alent variation, by a non-negligible 0:8%. That is, household consumption (of both nondurables
and housing services) in the steady state with the subsidy has to be increased by this percentage
in all states of the world and for all households, such that a household is indierent ex ante (that
is, prior to knowing what part of the distribution he will be born into) between being born into
the steady state with or without the subsidy.14
Figure 9 sheds some light on who (that is, households with which characteristics) benets
from the subsidy. The gure plots the steady state consumption equivalent gain for households
with dierent income realizations against cash at hand.15 This plot should only be understood as
a quantitative answer to the following hypothetical question: in which economy would someone
with state (a;y) prefer to start her life, an economy with or without subsidy? Our results indicate
that the welfare gains from the subsidy are monotonically increasing in wealth, with wealth-poor
households preferring to start life in the economy without subsidy while households with high
wealth benet from the subsidy. Similarly, holding wealth xed higher current income households
view the mortgage interest rate subsidy more favorably that income-poor households.
The heterogeneity in the welfare assessment of the policy across households is due to the
following factors. First, the subsidy keeps interest rates on the nancial assets of wealthy house-
holds high (since the subsidy fuels a stronger mortgage demand), and second, it provides these
households (which invest in bonds and leverage substantially in real estate) with a direct interest
rate subsidy for this investment strategy. Poorer households, on the other hand, derive a larger
share of their current resources from labor income which is subject to the tax that nances the
mortgage rate subsidy. Thus these households would prefer having the subsidy and the tax that
comes with it removed, especially if their wealth is so low that debt-nanced investment into real
estate becomes suboptimal for them and thus the subsidy does not apply to these households.
We conclude (and view this as our most important normative nding) that masking the
aggregate moderate welfare gains from removing the policy is a substantial heterogeneity in the
welfare assessment of this policy across the population. The disagreement between households
is large: the poorest member of society would pay in excess of 1% of lifetime consumption to get
rid o the policy, whereas households with wealth twice the average would lose more than 1%
from the same policy reform.
13In our model nothing links the housing stock g0 a household owns to the housing services h she consumes.
These need not be the same physical houses, although it is convenient for the interpretation of our results (along
the home ownership share dimension) to make that association.
14Steady state welfare comparisons can be problematic since they ignore the welfare consequences of the tran-
sition path towards the new steady state (and thus the cost of additional accumulation of physical capital or the
stock of housing). In our model without capital the only transitional cost stems from building up the modest
extra 2.7% of the housing stock. We therefore expect the welfare gains from moving the policy to be somewhat
smaller, but still positive in the aggregate, once the transitional costs are accounted for.
15The same comments about ignoring the welfare eects along the transition apply, as before.
226 Conclusions
In this paper we construct an equilibrium model of mortgage debt and foreclosures and use it to
evaluate the aggregate and distributional consequences of a stylized bailout guarantee for GSE's
in the mortgage market. We argue that this guarantee leads to excessive mortgage origination,
higher leverage and larger foreclosure rates in equilibrium, compared to a world without such a
policy. The steady state aggregate welfare gains from abolishing the guarantee are modest, but
positive, and income and wealth-poor households would strongly benet from such a reform.
Our environment would naturally lend itself to a quantitative evaluation of how much of the
run-up in household mortgage debt can be attributed to the government's implicit and now direct
involvement with the GSE's. It could also be used to study the distributional consequences of
the collapse in house prices given the high leverage partially induced by this involvement. We
defer this to future work.
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257 Theoretical Appendix
7.1 Endogenous Upper Bound on Leverage
In this section we will construct a proof of Proposition 2 in the main text.
Proof. In order to prove the statement, we will rst show that there exists a  that maximizes
the contemporaneous resources available to the household. Then we will show that in equilibrium
households will only chose values of leverage less than  and that that value is strictly less than
the leverage which leads to certain default.
First, consider the period budget constraint:
c + bPb + hPl + g   mPm (g;m) = a + gPl (12)
This can be rewritten as:
g[1   Pl   Pm (g;m)] = a   c   hPl   bPb (13)
For a xed g > 0, we can calculate the value of m that will generate the maximal amount of
resources available today:
m
 2 arg min
0mg(1 )
[g[1   Pl   Pm (g;m)] (14)
, m
 2 arg min
0mg(1 )
 mPm (g;m) (15)
Note that the upper bound on m is the leverage that will result in default for sure in the
second period. It can be shown that borrowing above this level does not increase resources
available today. Further, this compacties and choice space and guarantees the pricing function






+  = 0 (16)
where   0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the upper constraint (the lower bound trivially is not
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Notice that the rst term goes to zero as we approach the upper constraint on leverage. The
second term is weakly negative (since  < 1 and f  0). Thus, since we have constructed our
maximization problem to guarantee that   0, the only admissible value is  = 0. Thus, we
can characterize interior value of leverage which satises the FOC by the implicit equation:

 =
F (1   )
(1   )f (1   )
(19)








for x 2 (;1). The RHS is strictly increasing in x, and takes values from [1=(1 );1). The LHS
is decreasing and also unbounded above (both coming from log-concavity of F). Thus, from a
standard xed-point theorem in R, there exists an x in that interval which satises the equation
and it is unique.




g(1 + rb + p)
f(   2)f (1   ) + (1   )f
0 (1   )g (21)
If the SOC is strictly positive at , the FOC condition will be necessary and sucient for a
minimum, and thus will characterize the leverage which yields the maximal amount of contem-
poraneous resources. Log-concavity of F() is sucient for the SOC to be strictly positive. To







0 (1   
) <
f (1   )
F (1   )
f (1   
)
) (1   )
f
0 (1   
) < f (1   
)
where the last inequality comes from equation (19). Now, this last inequality, along with the
fact that  < 1 and f  0 implies that the SOC at  will be strictly positive. Thus, we have
shown that our interior  is indeed a maximum.
Now that we've shown the existence of  to prove the rst statement, suppose by way
of contradiction that a household has chosen an aordable allocation fc;h;b;g;mg such that
 > . Consider another allocation fc0;h0;b0;g0;m0g, where h0 = h, b0 = b, g0 = g and m0 is
such that m0
g0 =  and c0 = c+m0Pm() mPm(). Note that this new allocation is aordable,
m0Pm() > mPm() ) c0 > c (from above) and cash-at-hand in the next period will be weakly
greater in all possible states under the primed allocation than the original (since b = b0, g = g0
and m0 < m, b + max((1   )g   m;0)  b0 + max((1   )g0   m0;0)). Thus, from the strict
monotonicity of the utility function, the primed allocation yields strictly higher period utility
and weakly higher continuation value, and thus is strictly preferred to the original.
7.2 Existence, Uniqueness and Characterization of the Value Func-
tion
7.2.1 Denitions
First we need some denitions. Let the M  R+ mortgage choice set, B  R+ be the bond
choice set, G  R+ be the housing choice set, C  R+ the consumption expenditure choice set.
The state variable, cash-at-hand, a 2 A  R+. Income, y 2 Y , where Y is a nite set. We dene
the budget correspondence   : A ! C  B  G  M as:
 (a) = f(c;b;g;m) 2 C  B  G  M : c + bPb + g[1   Pl]   mPm (g;m)  a; m  g~ g (22)
where ~  is the endogenous maximal leverage characterized previously.

















where x = (c;b0;g0;m0) and (b0;g0;m0;0;y0) = b0 + max((1   0)g0   m0;0) + (1   )y0. We can

















16We will show in the next section that   is compact valued, so the maximum of the program will be obtained,
justifying our use of the max-operator as opposed to the sup-operator.
28With our denitions in hand, we proceed to discuss the properties of the budget correspondence
and our operator.
7.2.2 Properties of   and T
We begin by establishing properties of  . First, it is non-empty (0 2  (a)) and monotone. Given
prices that satisfy17 1   Pl   Pm() > 0 8 2 [0; ~ ], we can show that   is also continuous and
compact valued. To prove this we endeavor to apply Theorems 3.4 and 3.5 from Stokey & Lucas
(1989). We will show that the conditions for these two theorems are met by proving two lemmas.
Lemma 1 The graph of  , G = f(a;c;b;g;m) 2 A  C  B  G  M : (c;b;g;m) 2  (a)g is
closed, and for any bounded set ^ A  A,  ( ^ A) is bounded.
Proof. To show that the graph is closed, take a sequence f(an;cn;bn;gn;mn)g1
n=0 such that
(cn;bn;gn;mn) 2  (an) for all n that converges to (a;c;b;g;m). Suppose that (c;b;g;m) = 2
 (a). This implies either c + bPb + g[1   Pl]   mPm (g;m) > a or m > g~ . However,
since everything is continuous here, that implies that there exists some N such that ones of the
inequalities is also violated for (aN;cN;bN;gN;mN), but that implies (cN;bN;gN;mN) = 2  (aN),
a contradiction.
To show that  ( ^ A) is bounded, let ^ a = sup ^ A. Since   is monotone, if  (^ a) is bounded,  ( ^ A)
will be bounded. Now, observe that 0  c  a, 0  b  a=Pb. To prove that g is bounded above
is equivalent to showing 8a 2 R+ 9 g  0 s:t: 8g >  g; (c;b;g;m) = 2  (a). We will construct
such a candidate  g. We propose  g(a) such that  g(a) = a=[1   Pl   ~ Pm(~ )], where ~  is the
endogenous leverage limit. Now, suppose by way of contradiction that there was an allocation
(c;b;g;m) 2  (a) with g >  g(a). This implies that:
c + bPb + g[1   Pl   Pm (g;m)]  a (25)
) c + bPb + g[1   Pl   
Pm (g;m
)]  a (26)
) g   g  
c + bPb
1   Pl   Pm (g;m)
(27)
) g   g )( (28)
Thus, for any a,  (a) is bounded )  (^ a) is bounded )  ( ^ A) is bounded.
Lemma 2 The graph of  , G, is convex, and for any bounded set ^ A  A, there exists a bounded
set ^ X  C  B  G  M such that  (a) \ ^ X 6= ; for all a 2 ^ A.
Proof. The second part of the lemma is trivially satised by letting ^ X = f(0;0;0;0)g.
In order to show convexity we need to establish that  mPm(m;g) is convex, which will make
c + bPb + g[1   Pl]   mPm (g;m) convex in c;b;g;m, guaranteeing that the inequality constraint
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17This is a no-arbitrage condition on the relation between the interest rate and rental rate, and thus will be
true in any equilibrium
29The Hessian is singular, in order to show that the matrix is positive semi-denite, and hence
that  mPm(m;g) is convex, we only need to show that the two diagonal elements are positive.
Thus, we need to show that 2P 0
m + P 00







1 + rb + p
f(   2)f (1   ) + (1   )f
0 (1   )g (30)
Focusing on:
(   2)f (1   ) + (1   )f
0 (1   ) (31)
We again employ the maintained assumption of log-concavity of F() to show:
f (1   ~ )
F (1   ~ )

f (1   )
F (1   )
8 2 [0; ~ ] (32)
) f
0 (1   ) <
f (1   ~ )
F (1   ~ )
f (1   ) 8 2 [0; ~ ] (33)
) f
0 (1   ) <
1
(1   )~ 
f (1   ) 8 2 [0; ~ ] (34)
) f
0 (1   ) <
1
(1   )
f (1   ) 8 2 [0; ~ ] since f > 0 (35)
(1   )f
0 (1   ) < f (1   ) 8 2 [0; ~ ] (36)
(37)
which guarantees that (30) is negative, which gives that the diagonal elements are non-negative,
combined with the fact that the determinant is zero, yields that the Hessian is positive semi-
denite on  2 [0; ~ ], which is equivalent to g 2 [0;  g(a)];m 2 [0;g~ ]. Thus, we've established
convexity of G.
These two lemmas, combined with Stokey & Lucas theorems 3.4 and 3.5, guarantee that  
is compact valued, u.h.c and l.h.c. Since we are dealing with the simplied household problem,
we need to show some properties about utility function over consumption expenditure.
Lemma 3 u(c;Pl) is continuous, strictly concave, strictly increasing.
Proof. Take c1;c2 > 0 and c=c1 +(1 )c2 for  2 (0;1). u(ci;Pl)  U(~ ci;hi) where ~ ci and hi
are from the maximizers. From the strict concavity of U, we know that
U(~ c1;h1) + (1   )U(~ c2;h2) < U(~ c1 + (1   )~ c2;h1 + (1   )h2)
 U(~ c;h)
where the rst inequality comes from the strict concavity of U and the second from the fact that
~ c1 + (1   )~ c2 + Pl(h1 + (1   )h2) = c1 + (1   )c2 = c, thus it's a feasible choice for the
maximization for u(c;Pl), and by denition of a max. Continuity and strict monotonicity follow
from the properties of U.
Since we have assumed that the utility function is unbounded from below, we use a similar
argument to Chatterjee et al. (2007) to establish the existence and uniqueness of the value




















Lemma 4 V is non-empty. (V;k  k) is a complete metric space, where k  k is the sup-norm.
Proof. Take any constant function v0 satisfying (38). v0 is continuous and satises (39) by the
assumption that u is unbounded below. In order to show that (V;k  k) is complete, rst note
that (C;kk) is complete, where C is the set of continuous functions from AY ! R. First note
that V  C, and thus it is sucient to show that V is a closed subset of C. So take any sequence
of functions fvng1
n=0 2 V such that vn ! v. We need to show that v 2 V. Suppose not, i.e.
v = 2 V. Then either v is not continuous, or (38) or (39) was violated. Continuity is preserved
because vn ! v uniformly given the sup-norm. If (38) is violated, then there must exist some
N such that it is also violated for vN, contradicting that vN 2 V. Finally, given (38), (39) is
satised by the assumption of unboundedness of u from below.
Now we need to show that for all v 2 V, Tv 2 V. Thus, we need to establish that
T preserves continuity, (38) and (39). To show that T preserves continuity, rst note that
(b0;g0;m0;0;y0) is a continuous function. Thus v(;y) is also continuous, because the composi-



















is a continuous function in c;b0;g0;m0 on C  B  G  M. That, combined with the previously
established fact that   is compact valued and continuous allows us to assert the continuity of Tv
from the Theorem of the Maximum. To show that (38) is preserved, note that u(c;Pl) is bounded
above by  u, thus Tv   u+ u=(1 ) =  u=(1 ). Further, choosing a consumption expenditure of
c = (1 )ymin is feasible in all periods, thus Tv  u((1 )ymin;Pl)+u((1 )ymin;Pl)=(1 ) =
u((1   )ymin;Pl)=(1   ). This result, combined with The assumption that u(0;Pl) =  1
guarantees that Tv satises (39). Thus TV  V.
And now the nal lemma necessary to prove our main result:
Lemma 5 The operator T is a contraction with modulus .
Proof. To prove this we will show that T satises monotonicity and discounting and then apply
Blackwell's (Stokey & Lucas Theorem 3.3).
Take v;w 2 V such that v(a;y)  w(a;y) for all (a;y) 2 AY . We want to show that Tv 

















Tv + . Thus, from Blackwell's, T is a contraction mapping.
31Proposition 5 Under the maintained assumptions on u and the assumption that F() is C2
and log-concave, there exists a unique v 2 V such that Tv = v. Furthermore, v is strictly
increasing in a.
Proof. From Lemma's 5, 4 and the contraction mapping theorem, there exists a unique v 2 V
such that Tv = v. In order to show that v is increasing in a we appeal to the monotonicity

































































where the third line comes from the strict monotonicity of u. The fourth line comes from the fact
that a0  a > 0 and the fact that if (c;b0;g0;m0) 2  (a) ) (c +a0  a;b0;g0;m0) 2  (a0).
7.2.3 Characterization
In this section we prove Proposition 4.
Proof. We seek to apply theorem 3 of Clausen and Strub (2011). Consider re-writing the value
function as follows:














where x and   are dened as before, but now
a = b
0 + y





where we explicitly model the foreclosure decision with d0. Since, as we showed above, the value
function is nite and if the utility function is dierentiable then it will also be dierentiable
with respect to b;g;m holding g0;b0;m0;d;d0 constant, and dierentiable with respect to g0;b0;m0
holding b;g;m;d;d0 constant (based on how it is dened above). Then, we can conclude that if
(g0;b0;m0;d0) is an optimal choice at b;g;m;d; and g0;b0;m0 > 0, then V will be dierentiable
in g0;b0;m0 for all 0. Taking rst order conditions and rearranging yields the characterization in
Proposition 4.
327.3 Computational Appendix
7.3.1 Simplication of the Household Problem
For computation it will be convenient to split the household maximization problem into a port-
folio choice problem in which the household chooses how much to invest in bonds and houses
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0)g
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0)g + (1   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0
This last problem can be conveniently expressed as a choice problem of just bond b0 and leverage
0 = m0=g0: Note that if g0 = 0 the household cannot borrow and thus 0 = 0:First, we can write
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7.3.2 Labor Income Process
From the Tauchen procedure we obtain (after de-logging) the ve labor productivity shock real-






0:7629 0:2249 0:0121 0:0001 0:0000
0:2074 0:5566 0:2207 0:0152 0:0001
0:0113 0:2221 0:5333 0:2221 0:0113
0:0001 0:0152 0:2207 0:5566 0:2074





33which in turn implies the stationary distribution  = (0:1907;0:2066;0:2053;0:2066;0:1907) and
average labor productivity of one.
348 Figures
35Figure 1: Housing Policy Function





















































36Figure 2: Leverage Policy Function





























37Figure 3: Bonds Policy Function
















































38Figure 4: Housing Policy Function With and Without Subsidy






























































































(units of mean income)
39Figure 5: Leverage Policy Function With and Without Subsidy





















































(units of mean income)
40Figure 6: Bonds Policy Function With and Without Subsidy
























































































(units of mean income)
41Figure 7: Home Equity Policy Function With and Without Subsidy
















































































































(units of mean income)
42Figure 8: Distribution over Cash at Hand with and without Subsidy

























43Figure 9: Welfare Comparison
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